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INTRODUCTION 
 
he ghost of Descartes still hangs over the philosophy 
and science of the mind. But there is disagreement 
about the extent to which the ghost is a beneficent spirit to 
be honored and respected, or a dark shade to be maligned 
and shunned. While we have exorcised the idea that the 
mind is immaterial, many think that the exorcism remains 
incomplete. We must also, they urge, cast out the very idea 
of the mind as a separate realm. Mind and body, mind and 
world; these are false dichotomies that hinder our 
understanding. 
 
In the past two decades this strongly anti-Cartesian view 
has gained momentum and also diversity. There are now 
many approaches to the project of completing the exorcism. 
There are also some who think that even these approaches 
themselves are still tainted by dualism, and who therefore 
push for even more radical or comprehensive anti-
Cartesianism. Here I review two books which take this 
stance towards two particular anti-Cartesian approaches. 
Giovanna Colombetti argues that the enactivist approach—
pioneered by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and 
Eleanor Rosch in The Embodied Mind (1991), and now 
championed by Thompson—should expand its purview 
from cognitive science into the domain of affective science. 
Douglas Robinson argues that the extended mind thesis 
(EMT)—pioneered by Andy Clark and David Chalmers in 
‘The extended mind’ (1998), and now championed by 
Clark—should reconceive the mind, and thus its extension, 
in terms of qualia rather than material events. 
 
The two books have a certain affinity, hinted at by the fact 
that their main titles both feature the word ‘feeling’. Both 
authors want their respective anti-Cartesian approaches to 
place more emphasis on subjective or qualitative features of 
T 
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the mind. Indeed, both of them think that some such feature 
is fundamental to the nature of the mind.  
 
However, again, Colombetti and Robinson are working 
within different approaches: enactivism and the EMT 
respectively. And another difference is that while both offer 
revisionist views, Robinson’s revisionism is very much 
more radical. He aims to reshape some basic assumptions 
of the EMT. By contrast, Colombetti accepts the basic 
assumptions of enactivism. Her revisionism takes the form 
merely of pressing for a new application of the approach.  
 
I find Colombetti’s book highly engaging and her argu-
ments, in most respects, very persuasive. I would expect it 
to find a wide readership amongst enactivists, but I hope it 
also will be read by all philosophers, psychologists and 
neuroscientists working on the emotions.  
 
My opinion of Robinson’s book is less positive. I struggled 
to understand his views, often (it seemed to me) because of 
a lack of explanation and argument on his part. Further, he 
was often careless in handling the views and arguments of 
his opponents. Despite some thought-provoking ideas, then, 
overall the book is a frustrating and uneven read. 
 
COLOMBETTI, THE FEELING BODY: AFFECTIVE 
SCIENCE MEETS THE ENACTIVE MIND 
 
Colombetti’s book comprises seven chapters, not counting 
a brief introduction and an even briefer epilogue. The main 
body of the book could be loosely split into two parts: 
chapters 2-4 and chapters 5-7. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are 
broadly concerned with current affective science. Chapters 
5, 6 and 7 then take a phenomenological perspective on 
affect and emotion.  
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As for chapter 1, it serves as background, advocating a 
“broader and deeper notion of affectivity” (p. 1) than is 
current in affective science. For Colombetti, emotions and 
moods are merely the most noticeable manifestations of a 
more fundamental phenomenon, which she calls primordial 
affectivity. She traces the roots of this idea through the 
work of several philosophers (from Spinoza to Jan 
Patočka), but thinks that the enactive approach allows for 
its fullest expression. According to enactivism, living 
systems are intrinsically sense-making systems: they 
evaluate their environment with regard to their own 
continued viability, and act to improve that viability. Even 
bacteria evaluate their environment for the presence of the 
sugar they need, and swim toward higher concentrations. 
So sense-making does not require a brain or even a nervous 
system. It is a function of the organism’s overall 
organization. Further, for the enactivist, sense-making just 
is cognition. This much is basic to the enactivist approach. 
What Colombetti adds is the claim that there can be no 
distinction between cognition and affect. So if all 
organisms are sense-making systems, and if sense-making 
just is cognition, and if cognition in turn just is affectivty—
then all organisms are affective. Hence the notion of 
primordial affectivity.  
 
Of course, many will not grant all (or any) of those ‘if’s. 
Colombetti admits that her book is not a defense of 
enactivism, but simply takes it as a starting point. This is 
fair enough; other works offer that defense (especially 
Thompson 2007). The third ‘if’, however—that cognition is 
inherently affective—is her own, and her defense of it 
struck me as sketchy. Her argument seems to stem from a 
very broad conception of affect as any activity that 
concerns what is “meaningful, relevant, or salient” (p. 15) 
for the organism. When we combine that with the enactivist 
conception of cognition (i.e., sense-making) as a sort of 
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self-concerned evaluation, it is indeed natural to conclude 
that cognition is always affective. But Colombetti does not 
defend her very broad conception of affect, and such a 
defense is surely necessary.  
 
All of that said, I agree with Colombetti when she remarks 
in her introduction that many of her ideas can stand 
independently of the enactivist framework. And the notion 
of primordial affectivity actually appears only once after 
chapter 1, and then only in passing.  
 
As I said earlier, chapters 2-4 focus on current affective 
science. Chapter 2 critically reviews some prominent 
existing accounts of emotion. Chapter 3 presents 
Colombetti’s own account. Chapter 4 (echoing themes from 
chapter 1) argues that we must not artificially separate the 
evaluation of a stimulus from the emotional response to the 
stimulus.  
 
The main focus of chapter 2 is the theory of basic emotions 
(BET), which is the preeminent view of emotions today. 
Cross-cultural studies by Paul Ekman and colleagues in the 
late 1960s appeared to indicate that six ‘basic’ emotions—
happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust, and surprise—were 
universal. But Colombetti argues that the distinction 
between ‘basic’ and ‘nonbasic’ emotions is poorly 
motivated, and further that the decision as to which 
emotions are basic has been arbitrary. Ekman adopted the 
idea of basic emotions from Silvan Tomkins, but 
Colombetti sees little warrant for Tomkins’ own 
hypothesis. Moreover, Tomkins hypothesized nine 
‘primary affects’, not six. Colombetti relates a telling 
anecdote from a 2011 conference talk, where a former 
collaborator of Ekman’s said that while they had intended 
to study all nine of Tomkins’ affects, they were able to get 
suitable photographs only for six. Memory being what it is, 
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we should not simply assume that this recollection reflects 
the complete story. Still, Colombetti makes a good case 
that the concept of ‘basic’ emotions is due for retirement.  
 
Colombetti also reviews two alternatives to BET: James 
Russell and Lisa Barrett’s psychological constructionist 
model and Klaus Scherer’s component process model. 
(Oddly, she does not mention Alan Fridlund’s behavioral 
ecology view.) Her discussion of these models is briefer 
than her discussion of BET, and I found it a little unclear 
why she rejects Scherer’s model; but further discussion in 
chapter 3 explained that the problem is that the model gives 
too much of a controlling role to appraisal.  
 
As well as being skeptical of the ‘basic’ versus ‘nonbasic’ 
distinction, Colombetti thinks that BET wrongly conceives 
of emotions as a set of more or less programmed responses. 
Along with the idea of basic emotions, Ekman also adopted 
Tomkins’ idea of affect programs: genetically encoded, 
adaptive neural mechanisms which drive emotional 
responses. While Colombetti grants that BET is not wedded 
to a vision of emotions as rigidly prototypical, she 
nevertheless prefers to conceive of emotions in a more 
flexible manner. Thus in chapter 3 she draws on dynamical 
systems theory (DST) to suggest that emotions are “specific 
self-organizing forms… that recruit or entrain various 
processes (neural, muscular, autonomic, etc.) into highly 
integrated configurations or patterns” (p. 69). There are no 
internal affect programs which trigger prototypical bodily 
(especially facial) responses. Rather, emotional episodes 
are soft-assembled through the activity of a variety of 
factors. Some of these factors will reliably co-occur, by 
becoming (in the DST lingo) attractors in the system’s state 
space.  
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Colombetti offers a nice analogy to explain how this 
dynamic model pictures the interplay of emotions and 
moods. Moods are like climate zones while emotions are 
like weather: 
 
A climate zone… is a complex system 
characterized by distinctive conditions… 
that remain stable over time. Different 
climate zones are characterized by different 
weather, namely, short-lived manifestations 
of specific conditions. Climate zones are 
longer lived and set up the conditions for 
different weather patterns; in particular, 
some weather phenomena are possible only 
within certain climate zones and impossible 
in others….On the other hand, the reiteration 
of certain weather patterns may induce shifts 
in the climate zone, especially when in 
conjunction with changes taking place 
outside the climate zone itself. (pp. 78-79) 
 
Similarly, moods tend to be stable over relatively long 
periods of time (from hours to months), and certain 
emotions manifest more than others within those periods. A 
grouchy person, for example, is more likely to show anger 
or jealousy than joy or gratitude. Yet if the environment 
(analogous to areas beyond the climate zone in question) 
changes in certain ways—an improvement in family 
relations, a new job, a paper accepted to a good journal—
the resulting positive emotions, if there are enough of them, 
may alter the person’s grouchy mood.  
 
I was less convinced by a discussion of the intentionality of 
moods. Many philosophers think that the difference 
between emotions and moods is that the former are directed 
at particular objects, while the latter are either not 
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intentional at all, or are directed only at general or 
nonspecific objects. Colombetti’s view is that moods are 
intentional, but she does not think that a mood can be about 
things in general. I agree. However, her solution is opaque. 
Appealing to a “non-object-oriented form of intentionality” 
(p. 81) offered by Husserl, she argues that “moods are 
intentional not in the narrow sense that they target objects 
but in the broader sense that they are ‘open’ to the world” 
(p. 80). Perhaps I reveal my analytic training here, but I get 
nervous in the presence of scare quotes, and the ones 
Colombetti uses here worry me. What is it to be open to the 
world in a way that is intentional yet directed neither at any 
specific object nor at the world in general? It is not that I 
think Colombetti is wrong, but that I wanted a less 
metaphorical explanation of her view. I was surprised that 
she does not invoke either DST or enactivism at this point, 
for it seems to me that they might provide the resources for 
a more concrete explanation. The wide-angle form of 
intentionality that she is gesturing at might, for example, be 
explained in terms of some sort of dynamic coupling of the 
agent with the environment, including other agents. So this 
struck me as a missed opportunity for Colombetti to extend 
the reach of her own favored approach.  
 
Chapter 4 focuses on appraisal. The study of appraisal 
began, Colombetti explains, as a reaction against the 
James-Lange model’s identification of emotions with 
perceptions of bodily change, which (critics claimed) 
couldn’t account for the variability of emotional responses. 
But the reaction ended up “reducing [the body] to an 
undifferentiated pattern of physiological (i.e., autonomic) 
arousal” (p. 87), leaving it to the subsequent appraisal to 
determine the actual emotional state. As a rough analogy 
(mine, not Colombetti’s), consider the ‘check engine’ light 
in your car. When that light comes on, you know something 
is wrong, but the light doesn’t tell you what. You can only 
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infer, based on the context and other available information, 
what the problem might be. Similarly, psychologists in the 
1960s and 1970s treated bodily arousal as a signal that 
something significant was happening, and argued that 
cognitive processes then used situational cues in order to 
label the response as a particular emotion. Such was the 
power of this picture, claims Colombetti, that both the 
physiological and phenomenological differentiation of 
arousal was ignored. Not only is bodily arousal far more 
differentiated than a check engine light, but it is also a 
mistake to think of that arousal as just a trigger for a more 
sophisticated appraisal. Here enactivism re-enters 
Colombetti’s story in earnest, for appraisal theories are 
noticeably Cartesian in that they treat the body as a passive 
unit rather than an active participant in the formation of 
emotions. Colombetti persuasively argues that bodily 
processes are actually components of emotional processes, 
and thus components of the appraisal process.  
 
The book now turns to issues of phenomenology. The 
broad thrust of chapters 5 and 6 is that affective science has 
paid too little attention to the bodily phenomenology and 
physiology of emotions.  
 
Colombetti’s main thesis in chapter 5 is that as well as 
bodily feelings which are actually about the body, there are 
also bodily feelings which present the world to us. Many 
emotion experiences are thus bodily feelings in the sense 
that “the lived or feeling body contributes to the quality of 
the emotion experience as that through which the object or 
event is experienced” (p. 114). In short, the body can be 
present in an emotion experience without being an 
intentional object of the experience. This is an intriguing 
idea, but I wonder about the details.  
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Colombetti uses the following metaphor. Certain bodily 
feelings are like tinted windows, so that even if one is 
attending to the world, one may experience the world as 
affectively colored—just as we experience the world as 
tinted if we look through tinted windows. An example she 
offers is that if you are chased by a dog while riding your 
bike, your fear of the dog will be colored by a bodily sense 
of vulnerability and tension. Now the window analogy 
suggests that the affective coloration is not a property of the 
world itself, but is attributed to the world (just as the 
bluishness of a tinted window may be attributed to a tree 
outside the window). Yet this seems wrong, for you do not 
attribute vulnerability or tension to the dog. Colombetti 
says, “I have a nonattended sense of my body as rigid and 
ready to be attacked, through which I attend to the dog” (p. 
122). This suggests that it is just a matter of attention: you 
are attending to the dog and not to your body. But that on 
its own does not explain how your body is nevertheless 
present in your experience. In the end, while your bodily 
sense of vulnerability surely does affect your experience of 
the dog in some way, it is not clear that Colombetti has 
explained just how that happens. The idea that you 
experience the menace of the dog through your bodily 
sense of vulnerability is intuitive, but I worry that it is a 
metaphor that breaks down on examination.  
 
Chapter 6 attempts to add a bodily component to Varela’s 
(1996) neurophenomenological method. Colombetti dubs 
the result neuro-physio-phenomenology. She thinks that 
affective science currently pays too little attention to bodily 
processes, and to the phenomenology of affect (especially 
its bodily phenomenology). So the chapter offers a five-
step method for incorporating the physiology and 
phenomenology of affect into empirical neuroscience. The 
main worry about such a method, of course, concerns the 
scientific validity of first-person reports of experience. But 
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Colombetti is cautiously optimistic that, with training and 
practice, both experimenters and their subjects can learn to 
make accurate and reliable self-observations. Even if the 
training itself alters the trainee’s emotional experiences 
(and Colombetti is not convinced that it will), the resulting 
data will at least be stable and consistent, which will allow 
for better data on the relationship between consciousness 
and neurophysiological processes.  
 
The final chapter concerns our interactions with other 
agents, exploring of the role of affect in face-to-face 
encounters. Now the standard Cartesian assumption here is 
that since the mind is an internal entity, grasping the mental 
states of others involves inference: that is, we have only 
indirect access to other minds. Colombetti rejects that 
assumption. As an enactivist she holds that the mind is 
embodied, and therefore that the minds of other agents are 
directly perceived in their actions. And she holds that this 
direct perception is a basic form of empathy. Later she 
argues that we nonconsciously mimic the facial and bodily 
expressions of others, and that this facilitates our grasp of 
their emotions. Of course, this starts to make her view 
sound like a variety of simulation theory, according to 
which we grasp the mental states of others by simulating 
them. Colombetti is aware of this, and emphasizes that she 
is not saying that mimicry is necessary for grasping the 
emotions of others. The suspicion remains, however, that 
even basic empathy (which does not involve facial or 
bodily mimicry) is still a matter of simulation at some more 
basic level. As Colombetti herself admits, we cannot 
always directly observe another’s emotions, for people can 
hide their emotions. She rightly says that this does not 
entail that emotions are not embodied, but only that the 
externally-visible parts of the body may not always display 
an agent’s true feelings. Yet this calls into question her 
claim that we directly perceive the emotions of others. Also 
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notable in this connection is that Colombetti lumps 
simulationism in with the theory theory as a view on which 
we deploy “an intermediate inferential process” (p. 172) in 
order to understand other minds. But some versions of 
simulationism are marketed as involving no inferences: 
rather, we simply embody the other’s experiences directly. 
So one might wonder just what the distinction is between 
Colombetti’s view and those versions of simulationism.  
 
Muddying the waters further is the fact that Colombetti 
appears oddly hesitant in her exposition of the direct 
perception view. The hesitancy takes a form that I have 
remarked upon before in this review, namely, a sudden 
proliferation of scare-quotes for no apparent reason: 
 
[I]n the concrete encounter it is more often 
the case that the other’s mental states are 
picked up ‘directly’ by the observer, namely, 
without the need to engage in theorizing or 
pretend states. Thus, for example, the idea is 
that I ‘directly’ see the other’s pain in his 
convulsions, as opposed to when I 
‘indirectly’ infer that he is in pain because I 
see him taking a painkiller. (p. 175) 
 
Obviously it is dangerous to read too much into something 
which could just be the written equivalent of a vocal tic. 
But in this case, the very next paragraph contains a further 
hint of why Colombetti might be holding the words ‘direct’ 
and ‘indirect’ at arm’s length: 
 
I shall call the phenomenological notion of 
directly perceiving the other’s subjectivity… 
basic empathy, to distinguish it from other 
more elaborate and mediated ways of 
grasping how others feel—like when I need 
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also to recur to my knowledge of the other 
and to imagination (I do not deny that 
sometimes empathy requires these processes, 
but I shall not discuss them here). (p. 176) 
 
In the context provided by the previous passage, the 
parenthetical comment may be revealing. It appears to 
acknowledge that empathy—even basic empathy?—
sometimes is mediated by certain kinds of processing. 
Perhaps, rather than maintaining a strict division between 
direct and indirect forms of perception of other minds, 
Colombetti would be better to theorize that there is a 
gradation of directness. This, it seems to me, would fit 
better with her overall approach. One of the strongest 
themes in the entire book is that affective processes are not 
monolithic, categorical or routinized, but rather are messy, 
contingent and constructed on the fly.  
 
Happily, however, the latter three adjectives do not 
describe Colombetti’s book itself. In closing I want to 
especially note its clarity of organization. A five-page 
introduction and a two-page epilogue preview and review 
(respectively) the entire work. This structure is then 
duplicated in the individual chapters, each of which 
begins with a short introductory section and ends with an 
even shorter concluding section, previewing and 
reviewing the chapter’s content. This makes the book easy 
to navigate, and one is never in doubt about Colombetti’s 
aims and theses in any given chapter. All in all, then, I 
strongly recommend her book to anyone interested in 
either the enactivist approach to the mind, or in the 
science (or philosophy) of the emotions. It brings these 
two areas of contemporary inquiry together in a fruitful 
and fascinating way. 
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ROBINSON, FEELING EXTENDED: SOCIALITY AS 
EXTENDED BODY-BECOMING-MIND 
 
Nominally Robinson’s book comprises five chapters. But 
one could say that it really has seven, like Colombetti’s. 
For it has an introduction and an appendix each of which is 
30 pages long—which is as long or longer than three of the 
actual chapters.  
 
Where Colombetti wants to bring to the enactivist approach 
a greater focus on affect, Robinson wants to bring to the 
extended-mind thesis (EMT) a greater focus on qualia. He 
contends that the mind extends in the form of qualia (hence 
his main title), which he thinks can be socially transferred 
between individuals (hence his subtitle). The social 
extension of qualia is covered in chapters 2 through 5. But I 
shall first consider the introduction, chapter 1, and the 
appendix.  
 
Robinson says in his introduction that he intends to defend 
the EMT against the well-known criticisms of Fred Adams 
and Ken Aizawa (2008). However, he then states that the 
EMT is hamstrung by being based “in materialist claims 
about extension—that mind actually or literally does 
extend in some material sense” (p. 2). He proposes to 
abandon this materialist formulation of the EMT.  
 
Robinson stresses that he is not arguing against materialism 
itself. However, he never says what he means by 
‘materialism’. This sows confusion. The term’s dominant 
contemporary use is for the view that everything that exists, 
including the mind, is material. In many places in the book 
Robinson plainly uses the word in this sense. But on p. 3, 
right after saying that he does not deny materialism, he says 
that he does deny that the mind is material. In this instance, 
then, he must be using ‘materialism’ in its older and weaker 
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sense, which is for the view that there exist material 
objects. So based on these initial pages, one would get the 
idea that he is a dualist. But this is something that he will 
deny later in the book.  
 
The introduction also contains some puzzling passages 
specifically concerning Robinson’s ontology of the mind. 
Perhaps the most puzzling is this: 
 
The precarious position I propose to take 
here is a hybrid one. I accept the idea that… 
the mind’s interactions with the body and 
the surrounding world are constitutive of 
thought and so inseparable from thought. 
And I accept the claim that these 
interactions are material events…. To the 
extent that we want to understand these 
interactions as mind, however, they are, or 
so I shall argue, phenomenologies, felt by 
human subjects—not material events. (p. 5) 
 
A precarious position indeed. This is not quite a contra-
diction; but since Robinson offers no explanation of the 
crucial word ‘constitutive’, the reader is left to wonder how 
he proposes to avoid the threatened contradiction. Later, he 
notes that pre-publication reviewers of his book mostly 
concluded that he is an idealist. He replies that this is too 
simplistic. He says, “I’m a materialist who recognizes that 
everything we know about material reality is a quale, and 
an idealist who recognizes that qualia are human groups’ 
ultimately inadequate attempts to represent and control 
material reality” (p. 15). He appears, then, to want to 
embrace both materialism and idealism.  
 
How he proposes to do this is expounded in the appendix, 
which I advise reading before the book’s five main 
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chapters. Robinson calls his view liar-paradox (LP) 
monism, and suggests that it solves the hard problem of 
consciousness. In attempting to explain LP monism, he 
discusses the liar paradox, and Oscar Wilde’s essay ‘The 
Decay of Lying’. Robinson’s interest in the liar paradox is 
rhetorical rather than logical. Wilde’s essay, he says, 
suggests “a rhetorical [model] of reality: it’s not that reality 
is this way or that way, but that people work interactively 
with other people and with nonhuman objects to negotiate 
explanations of reality” (p. 201). We want to trust our 
qualia, but that trust is undermined by encounters with 
objects and people in which the world is presented in 
discrepant ways. We try to build a stable picture by 
studying the objects scientifically and by trying to reach 
agreements with other people; but we are never able to 
fully resolve the discrepancies. So LP monism “embrace[s] 
the dissonances, embrace[s] the complex phenomenality 
and rhetoricity of our engagement with the world” (p. 201).  
 
I agree that it seems inapt to describe this view as idealist. 
LP monism seems more like a form of ontological quietism. 
But I do not understand it, and I do not see how it solves the 
hard problem of consciousness. (Nor do I understand why it 
is a form of monism, despite Robinson’s claim to address 
that precise question on p. 203.) Still, the appendix provides 
some useful background when it comes to interpreting some 
of Robinson’s claims in the book’s main body.  
 
The book’s main title, Feeling Extended, has a double 
meaning. Firstly, it hints at Robinson’s central claim that 
qualia (i.e., feelings) extend beyond the body. As he notes, 
the EMT’s foremost defender, Andy Clark, denies this. 
Robinson argues, however, that Clark is actually committed 
to the extension of qualia by two requirements that Clark and 
Chalmers (1998) impose on their famous case of Otto. They 
suggest that for Otto’s notebook to be part of his mind, the 
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information he retrieves from it must be “automatically 
endorse[d]” and must also have been “consciously endorsed 
at some point in the past” (p. 17; qtd. in Robinson, p. 9). 
Robinson claims that since endorsement is itself a quale, it 
follows that Otto’s use of the notebook is also a quale.  
 
Robinson may be onto something here, but his point is 
poorly developed. For starters, the inference is shaky: even if 
Otto’s endorsement of the notebook’s information is a quale, 
why does this imply that his use of the information is also a 
quale? But further, the premise itself is dubious. While 
Otto’s past endorsement of the information was conscious, it 
is not so clear that his present endorsement is too; and 
Robinson offers no defense for the premise. He says that “it 
preconsciously feels to [Otto] as if his mind is extending to 
incorporate the notebook” (p. 12)—but his own word 
‘preconsciously’ suggests that Otto is, as Clark claims, using 
the notebook automatically, with no conscious endorsement.  
 
Again, there may be a good point here somewhere. There is 
a phenomenology to the effortless, habitual use of tools for 
thinking, and little attention has been paid to that 
phenomenology in discussion of the EMT—despite Clark’s 
own occasional hints at its importance, as Robinson notes. 
But Robinson (by contrast, I may remark, with Colombetti) 
does not attempt to investigate that phenomenology.  
 
The second meaning of the book’s main title hints at another 
key thesis: that your mind extends if it feels as if it extends. 
Robinson says that “[f]rom the perspective of liar-paradox 
monism… the only principled answer to [the question of 
whether cognition literally extends into the environment] is 
‘It feels as if it does, and so I want to assert that it does, but 
of course I could be lying (to myself)’” (p. 55).  
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Since I have already noted my puzzlement about LP 
monism, let us ask why Robinson might think that the 
feeling of mental extension is evidence that the mind does 
extend. He knows that this inference will meet with 
resistance, yet he does surprisingly little to defend it. For 
example, in §1.2 he makes a case study of his regular 
exercise of swimming laps in a pool, and in particular the 
motivational impact of different ways of tracking how far he 
has swum in a given session. Should he count laps, or 
lengths, or both? Robinson emphasizes that this is a matter 
of conation (will, motivation) more than cognition. His 
interest seems to be in the integration of a counting system—
an external tool—into one’s repertoire of mental skills. But 
beyond that, his point is unclear. He focuses on the feeling of 
facility in the use of a counting system, but he never explains 
how this is supposed to support the EMT. It might better 
support the enactivist approach, but Robinson mentions that 
approach only occasionally in the book.  
 
This sort of ambiguity appears throughout the book. 
Robinson’s writing is discursive and suggestive rather than 
argumentative, which often makes his points obscure. I 
often advise my students that it is not enough just to tell 
your readers something; you must also tell them why you 
are telling them that thing. Colombetti’s book is exemplary 
in this regard. Not so Robinson’s. Sign-posting is especially 
lacking in chapters 2-5, where he makes his case for the 
extension of qualia into and through the social 
environment. These chapters feature discussions of the 
work of authors including Derrida, Austin, Bakhtin, 
Aristotle, and Peirce. I was often unsure of just what these 
discussions were for, however, because Robinson seldom 
explicitly tells us how they relate to his overall project.  
 
Chapter 2 critiques what Robinson calls ‘rationalist philo-
sophy of language’ (RPOL), the view that communication 
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between humans is exclusively propositional. According 
to RPOL, says Robinson, thought exists only in the head, 
and language is just a set of cognitive labels: “sender S 
produces a propositional thought T, representing 
informational content I, which S then translates… into a 
coherent utterance U in natural language L; receiver R... 
retranslates the somewhat disorderly natural language of 
U back into the propositional clarity of T as a 
representation of I” (p. 67). As this quotation suggests, 
Robinson equates RPOL with the language of thought 
hypothesis (LOTH). So it is jarring when he claims that 
Clark adheres to RPOL—for Clark has been a major critic 
of LOTH. Robinson knows this, but says that Clark’s 
criticisms of LOTH are superficial, as he “doesn’t really 
challenge the bivalent logic of LOT vs. natural language” 
(p. 69). This plays into the hands of Adams and Aizawa, 
Robinson continues, whose critique of the EMT relies on 
a sharp distinction between the intrinsic, nonderived 
content of brain states versus the merely conventional, 
derived content of natural language.  
 
After arguing that the RPOL/LOTH picture is inadequate, 
in chapter 3 Robinson offers an alternative picture of 
language as “a channel of communicable (transferrable) 
bodily force—a conative force that energizes/mobilizes 
other bodies” (p. 85). This force is (or is composed of) 
qualia. Chapter 4 investigates the nature of qualia. Finally, 
chapter 5 explores empathy and affective communication 
as the sharing of qualia.  
 
Robinson never identifies anyone who holds RPOL. 
Frankly, this is not surprising: I doubt that any philosopher 
has held that “all communication between humans is 
linguistic and propositional” (p. 118), for this would 
collapse all communication into language. There is no 
reason for any LOT theorist to deny the existence of 
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nonlinguistic communication. Robinson also asserts that 
“LOT theorists were determined to reduce language to 
neural events and other dependencies found in material 
nature” (p. 87). Yet LOTH’s originator, Jerry Fodor, is 
well-known for his anti-reductionism (e.g. Fodor 1974).  
 
These errors are not isolated incidents. On several 
occasions Robinson inaccurately describes an opponent’s 
viewpoint. His characterizations of the views of Clark, and 
of Adams and Aizawa, are often near-caricatures, and he 
sometimes offers borderline ad hominem commentary into 
the bargain. For example: 
 
[T]he most telling of the anti-connectivist or 
anti-collectivist sentiments that seem to fuel 
Adams and Aizawa’s radical intracranialism 
is their argument that language is 
noncognitive because it is public, 
conventional, and non-original. That, I 
submit, is the utterly unconvincing claim 
that tips their hand: that your thought, 
spoken aloud or written in a language I can 
read, never shapes my thinking. If they are 
willing to go to such lengths to protect the 
sanctity and inviolability of intracranial 
thought, there is more to their critique of the 
EMT than a quest for truth…. [I suggest 
that] intracraniality is for them more an 
ideological hobby horse than a skeptically 
tested truth. (p. 172) 
 
I’m not sure which is more egregious here: the claim that 
Adams and Aizawa think that one person’s thoughts, even 
when verbalized, cannot affect anyone else’s; or the claim 
that their position stems from unexamined ideology rather 
than a concern for truth.  
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Here is another example of Robinson’s carelessness with 
the work of other authors. Chapter 4 begins by looking at 
Owen Flanagan’s (1992) claim that qualia are (contrary to 
what most have thought) available to third-person 
evaluation. Robinson quotes a single sentence from pp. 67-
68 in Flanagan which he thinks is Flanagan’s explanation 
of how qualia can be subject to third-person evaluation. Yet 
it is clear in Flanagan’s text that that sentence is not his 
explanation at all. The explanation actually appears on pp. 
71-72. As a result, Robinson constructs a version of 
Flanagan’s argument which bears little resemblance to 
what Flanagan actually says.  
 
There are other kinds of errors too. I was irked by the fact 
that on at least a half-dozen occasions Robinson refers to, 
or even quotes from, sources that are not listed in his 
references section. The most glaring example is on p. 18, 
where a substantial list of points, taking up at least half of 
the page, is attributed to a source identified as “Jackson 
(1988)”. No work by anyone of that name appears in the 
references section. While editors must bear partial 
responsibility for this sort of thing, it further amplifies an 
impression of unscholarly sloppiness on Robinson’s part.  
 
Let me return to Robinson’s argument. In chapter 3 he 
claims that speech acts convey a conative force which “puts 
pressure on its targets to behave differently” (p. 102). In 
chapter 4 he contends that this force consists of qualia. It is 
not clear, however, what he thinks qualia are. Partly this is 
because of the vagueness of his background ontology, LP 
monism. But the problem is exacerbated by further 
ambiguity over whether he thinks that qualia are 
representational. Much of chapter 4 concerns the views of 
Charles Peirce, who originated the concept of qualia. While 
I am uncertain what Robinson wants us to get from this 
analysis, the main question seems to be whether Peirce held 
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that all qualia are (to use Peirce’s term) interpretants. And 
that question seems to be similar to the contemporary 
question of whether all qualia are representational. And that 
raises a problem. For on p. 120 Robinson casually remarks 
that “it should be relatively uncontroversial” that “qualia 
are mental representations”. Yet by p. 136 he seems to have 
forgotten this, saying that “[q]ualia may or may not all be 
representations” (orig. emphasis).  
 
The larger issue, though, is how a quale can be a force 
which affects people’s actions if it is not material. Now, 
again, as I have noted, it is extremely unclear what 
Robinson means when he says that qualia are not material. 
Which reflects the overarching problem that I have also 
already noted: that it is often impossible to determine 
exactly what Robinson is claiming.  
 
Chapter 5 proposes a mechanism for the transfer of qualia 
between agents: mirror neurons. Clark and Chalmers 
(1998) claimed that we automatically rely on external 
objects in a way that makes those objects part of our minds. 
Robinson proposes that, via the operation of mirror 
neurons, we automatically rely on other people in much the 
same way. Does he think that as a result, our minds become 
united with the minds of those other people? I am not sure. 
Here I shall quote a somewhat lengthy passage which 
seems to lay out Robinson’s view as clearly as any: 
 
[I]t is specifically the body-sensing neural 
systems—proprioception and enterorecep-
tion—that simulate the body states of 
another human actor, suggesting… [that] 
those neural systems sense the states of both 
the central actor’s own body and various 
peripheral actors’ bodies, and in simulating 
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the latter blur the distinction between other-
awareness and self-awareness…. 
 
This model, obviously, would explain the 
contagiousness of yawns, or of affective 
states like hilarity and depression…. Body-
sensing consists of qualia: we have a qual-
itative feeling or sensation or experience of 
a body part or body state. The blurring of the 
distinction between other-awareness and 
self-awareness would entail the generation 
of locationally indeterminate qualia: we 
have a feeling of a body state but are unable 
to distinguish its precise source, whether it is 
my body or your body (or both). (pp. 153-
154) 
 
Now it seems to me that all that we can conclude from this 
passage is that it is sometimes hard to tell whether the 
ultimate cause of your affective state is something 
happening to you or something happening to another 
person. But in speaking of “locationally indeterminate 
qualia”, Robinson doesn’t just mean that it’s hard to tell 
whether their content is (say) your own hilarity or Sally’s 
hilarity. He means that the qualia do not determinately 
belong to either you or Sally; or (perhaps) that they belong 
to both of you. He follows the quoted passage with a 
rhetorical question: “If we can’t always feel or experience 
the difference between my affect and yours, how can we 
confidently state that affect doesn’t extend?” (p. 154). His 
implied answer, of course, is that we can’t. This again 
reflects the second reading of the book’s title that I noted 
earlier: if it feels as if your mind is extended beyond your 
body—and in this case, extended in a way such that it 
blends with another person’s mind—then your mind does 
so extend. Robinson appears to think that there is no real 
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criterion for distinguishing your qualia from mine. Yet 
surely there is an obvious criterion with which we might at 
least begin: that if you can feel a quale, then it’s yours! 
Even if this criterion is wrong, it is stunning that Robinson 
does not even consider it.  
 
Invoking mirror neurons here doesn’t help. Even if they 
exist (and there is some controversy about that), the mere 
fact that we are able to automatically simulate the emotions 
of others does not show that we literally share their qualia. 
Robinson will resist my word ‘literally’, perhaps invoking 
LP monism to argue that we cannot even understand what 
that word means here. I readily grant that there is 
conceptual unclarity in this area. We are far from being 
sure how to individuate or localize qualia. But that means it 
is crucial for discussions of these issues to be conducted 
with as much care and precision as possible. Unfortunately, 
Robinson’s discussion in Feeling Extended, while 
containing some thought-provoking ideas, suffers badly 
from a lack of these crucial features. 
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